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In September 2009, we hosted an unusual workshop at Duke Law
School. The workshop focused on the empirical evaluation of judges,
judging, and judicial institutions. Most work in this area has been
driven by the agendas and constraints of empirical researchers, and
empiricists from multiple disciplines—including history, sociology,
anthropology, political science, and law and economics—participated
in the workshop. But they were joined by judges and legal theorists,
who were invited to take the lead in selecting the specific issues to be
discussed at the workshop. The reason for the workshop’s unusual
makeup and structure was our conviction that the empirical analysis of
judging can be dramatically strengthened through the active
participation of judges and theorists. In this Essay, we explain why we
think conversations among these three groups are important. Then,
drawing on the workshop experience, we describe where and how we
believe that cooperation could do the most to advance the empirical
study of the judiciary, with special attention to issues of evaluation.
Before beginning, we should note that we paint with a broad brush
here and likely fail to give credit where it is due. This Essay should be
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read as a comment on general tendencies rather than on individual
studies or people. To the extent that it can be understood as reflecting
on individuals, we are not ourselves exempt from the criticisms.
I. GOALS OF THE WORKSHOP
The empirical analysis of judicial behavior is one of the fastest
growing areas of scholarship in the legal academy. The three of us bring
different perspectives to this literature. Two of us, a legal scholar and
a political scientist, have been involved in producing portions of that
empirical literature. The third, a former federal prosecutor and United
States District Judge and currently a law school dean, has been
sometimes a critic but also a proponent. Disagreements among us are
intense, with each at times finding the others’ perspectives on courts
and judges perplexing and frustrating, if not utterly misguided. Yet our
debates have resulted in agreement on three important points: the
emergence of this literature in legal academia is something to be
celebrated, its potential has not yet been realized, and its potential
would be realized more quickly if judges and legal theorists played a
larger role in producing it.
One reason to celebrate the growth of this literature is the
increased interaction between legal scholars and social scientists.
Despite much disagreement between social scientists and legal
academics on the how and why of studying judges, a number of scholars
from each side have begun talking and working together, realizing that
they can gain both new insights from each other and bigger audiences
for their work. Because of the research experience and methodological
expertise that social scientists bring to this partnership, the resulting
body of work is likely to be more rigorous and reliable than if it were
produced by legal scholars alone.
But this collaboration also brings dangers—in particular, that
methodological considerations will dominate theory rather than serve
it, resulting in research that is hyper-technical and theoretically narrow
or even irrelevant. If this happens, the research will be of little utility
or interest to those who should care most about it, including the
primary subjects of the literature: judges and those who depend most
upon our judicial institutions. Further, neither judges nor scholars with
training in other disciplines will be able to engage and be involved in
the research project if it takes such a technical turn.
To our eyes, there are already disturbing signs of a trend in this
direction. Specifically, in its themes and methodological approaches,
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the emerging empirical research in the legal academy tends to resemble
the work that social scientists were already doing. Part of the cause, we
think, is that legal academics and judges have been too reticent about
the strengths they bring to empirical research and therefore have not
pushed as hard as they might for work to move in new directions. Or
perhaps it is that social scientists have been too aggressive in pushing
their own perspectives, sometimes in a framework that is seen by
judges as attacking them or mocking their aspirations. Either way, we
do not think this trend best serves any of the groups involved.
There is a different direction available, one in which the
collaboration between legal scholars and social scientists expands to
incorporate more perspectives, particularly those of the primary
research subjects, and becomes more accessible, interesting, and
relevant. Perhaps another way to think of this approach, congenial to
law professors, is to think of the judges and the judiciaries as if they
were clients and not subjects.
A skeptic might correctly point out that our goals here cut against
the dominant paradigm in empirical research across a range of
disciplines, in which social scientists study phenomena from an
outsider’s perspective. They observe and measure and theorize about
their research subjects, but do not necessarily feel any need to interact
with them; and certainly not as collaborators. We are overstating, of
course. Our colleagues in anthropology and sociology, especially,
incorporate the subject-perspective into their research. But their work
has not figured prominently in the current enthusiasm in American law
schools for empirical research on courts. We hope that in the future
judges’ perspectives will play an increasing role in the research on
courts.
There is a different reason for our push toward increased
collaboration between researchers and their subjects and that has to do
with our goals. These goals are at least partially normative. We hope
that the research can have payoffs in the near future in terms of
yielding insights into how to improve the functioning of the judicial
system. The three of us believe that the quality of the judicial system is
important as a social and as an economic matter, and that aspects of
the system can be measured and studied to help determine whether it
can be improved and how. By contrast, there are others who are
skeptical of the measurement project itself—arguing that no
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measurement is better than partial measurement.1 The threshold
questions, then, are what should be measured and how.
II. WHAT TO MEASURE AND WHY
The questions for our workshop—what does it mean to judge well,
how well do judges perform, and how can judicial institutions be
arranged to promote the best possible performance?—are examples of
topics that could benefit from greater intellectual cross-fertilization.
Like all public officials entrusted with substantial power, judges should
be subjected to critical appraisal: holding them accountable for their
performance, identifying judges worthy of promotion, helping to
decide who is fit to be a judge in the first place, or reforming judicial
institutions to promote better judging. Judges themselves, in our
experience, are interested in the question of what makes a good judge
and, in many cases, would welcome research that attempted to tackle
that question, particularly when the outcome of that research might be
concrete suggestions for better judicial techniques or institutional
arrangements. We are hardly making radical statements here;
evaluative statements about judges and judging are far from rare.
Indeed, we have colleagues who, although hostile toward any attempt
to quantify aspects of judicial behavior, are comfortable evaluating the
quality of this or that judge based on a selection of noteworthy
opinions.
The challenge we confront, for which we would welcome help
from judges and theorists, is in identifying evaluative standards that are
widely held, firmly grounded in theory, and amenable to rigorous
empirical assessment. If we were to ask observers of courts about
judicial performance, we might well reveal some consensus about how
well judges do in general and even about which judges stand out as
particularly strong or weak. But if we were to press our respondents to
explain the grounds for their judgments, we suspect that the answers
would differ, with many struggling to give an explanation or even
define their terms.

1. See, e.g., Marin K. Levy, Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, The Costs of Judging Judges by
the Numbers, LEGAL WORKSHOP, (DUKE L.J., Feb. 25, 2010); William P. Marshall, Be Careful
What You Wish for: The Problems with Using Empirical Rankings to Select Supreme Court
Justices, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 134 (2004) (“[P]lacing too much emphasis on quantifiable
measures alone may . . . inhibit the selection of those with the qualities most needed for a
successful Supreme Court tenure.”).
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If we are correct that there is room for improvement in the critical
evaluation of judging, the main reason is not that judges and scholars
have been uninterested in the topic. It is not uncommon for judges to
share their thoughts about proper judging in print,2 and one of us can
attest that many judges who do not write on the topic still contemplate
it privately and with colleagues. There also have been a handful of
judges who have engaged the academic debates primarily to criticize
academic attempts to measure judicial behavior through empirical
study.3 Despite the apparent hostility of some judges, our impression
from both reading and observation at our workshop is that the tone of
their critiques is driven less by hostility to the idea that judicial
behavior can be evaluated (and that there are better and worse
performing judges and courts) than by the perception that academics
are aiming wide of the mark in terms of conducting the type of research
that might help improve the judicial system.4
On the academic side, there is some work directly on the question
of how to evaluate judging—including Solum’s (2003) theoretical
exploration5 and Cann’s (2007) empirical analyses.6 Empirical studies

2. E.g., Armistead M. Dobie, A Judge Judges Judges, 1951 WASH. U. L.Q. 471, 474–84;
Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., What Makes a Good Appellate Judge? Four Views, JUDGES’ J., Summer
1983, at 14, 14, 16–17; Joseph P. Nadeau, What It Means to Be a Judge, JUDGES’ J., Summer 2000,
at 34, 34–35.
3. E.g., Harry T. Edwards, Essay, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84
VA. L. REV. 1335, 1364–70 (1998); Bruce M. Selya, Pulling from the Ranks? Remarks on the
Proposed Use of an Objective Judicial Ranking System to Guide the Supreme Court Appointment
Process, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1281, 1281–83 (2005); Laura Denvir Stith, Response, Just Because
You Can Measure Something, Does It Really Count?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1743, 1743–45 (2009).
4. Further, it seems that judges perceive a tone of disrespect in some of the academic work
that seeks to rank judges on simple measures and reveal the secret “political” agendas of judges.
David F. Levi & Mitu Gulati, “Only Connect”: Toward a Unified Measurement Project, 58 DUKE
L.J. 1181, 1183 (2009) (“Judges . . . resent what they see as the obsession of some empiricists with
proving that judges determine case outcomes based on their judicial philosophies, which the
political scientists insist on calling ‘political bias.’”); Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel,
Response, Does the Supreme Court Follow the Economic Returns? A Response to a Macrotheory
of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1759, 1782 (2009) (“[M]any empiricists . . . seem to default to less
plausible explanations for judicial behavior—for example, that judges are voting their political
viewpoints or trying to affect the economy. These conclusions seem . . . inaccurate—even
offensive—to judges.”).
5. Lawrence Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34
METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 198–99 (2003) (“[J]udicial virtues include . . . temperance, courage, good
temper, intelligence, wisdom, and justice. . . . Judges ought to be selected on the basis of their
possession of . . . the judicial virtues.” (footnote omitted)).
6. Damon Cann, Beyond Accountability and Independence: Judicial Selection and State
Court Performance, 90 JUDICATURE 226, 229 (2007) (basing an empirical study of merit selection
efficacy on a survey of 2,428 state court judges who chose “‘making impartial decisions,’ ‘ensuring
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of judges and courts have become more common, and many of these
studies implicitly adopt some view of judging. Concerns about the
quality of judging are an important motivator of recent research into
heuristics and biases in judging.7 And even if they often go
unexpressed, normative considerations about the legitimacy of judges’
behavior underlie the question that has garnered more attention from
students of judicial behavior than any other: the extent to which judges’
personal policy preferences or moral views trump impartial
interpretations of legal materials in determining their decisions.
Outside of empirical studies, one may see the same implicit evaluation
issues in certain theoretical work, such as in the literature on
constitutional interpretation.
Lack of attention, then, is not a major obstacle to progress in the
study of judicial performance. In our view, a far more important
obstacle is the dearth of intellectual engagement among judges,
theorists, and empiricists. The result is empirical work that is often too
far removed from the core concerns of theorists and judges to reward
their attention and theoretical work that is typically too abstract to lend
itself to empirical testing.
Research into ideological voting illustrates this problem.
Empirical scholars have amassed mountains of evidence suggesting
that ideology plays an important role in judicial decisions, especially at
the United States Supreme Court. But this evidence seems to have had
only a limited impact on the way most theorists and judges think.
Empiricists are often frustrated by what seems like a stubborn refusal
to confront the implications of their findings, but there may be more to
the reactions than obstinacy. For example, it may be that the distinction
between the “legal” and “attitudinal” models does not capture all, or
even a large part, of what is important for the legitimacy of judicial
decisions.
If we are right to claim that there is a problem, what can be done
about it? At a general level, the crucial step is for judges, theorists, and
empiricists to engage in structured conversations. Workshops like ours
can help foster such conversations, and we hope to hold more of them.
Larger conferences, such as those sponsored by the Society for
Empirical Legal Studies, may also serve this purpose. In the end,

fairness under law,’ ‘defending constitutional rights and freedoms,’ and ‘providing equal justice
for rich and poor’” as the “most important” judicial duties).
7. E.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2007).
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however, there is no substitute for reading each other’s writings. There
have been signs of cross-disciplinary awareness in recent years. For
instance, Judge Posner, who has always engaged the social science
literature, is especially attentive to it in his latest book on judging;8 and
two recent books by theorists include extensive discussions of social
science research.9 Yet these authors are in a small minority. On the
other side, many empiricists care about theoretical issues; in fact, as
noted, the much-maligned attitudinal versus legal model debate is, at
bottom, about the legitimacy of judges’ behavior and self-presentation.
Still, caring about theoretical issues is not quite the same as reading
theorists and judges closely and designing studies specifically to test
their ideas or address their concerns.
Of course, writers cannot place all the blame on readers.
Empiricists might boost readership among judges and theorists by: a)
explaining their methods and results in ways that are clear and
unintimidating even to those without much training in empirical
research or statistics; b) avoiding resting their analyses on assumptions
that strike others as too unrealistic to take seriously; c) making the
theoretical and practical implications of their research more explicit;
and d) increasing their understanding of the law or legal framework so
as to avoid making inaccurate statements or assertions. Perhaps most
beneficial would be a greater focus in the first place on questions that
judges and theorists could be expected to care about. For instance, in
choosing criteria for evaluating judges or judicial institutions, they
could pay close attention to the normative arguments of theorists and
the practicalities of real life judging, the latter with an eye toward what
we can reasonably demand of human judges or what they can
reasonably hope to achieve.
Like empiricists, theorists and judges are more likely to attract
readers outside their own circles to the extent they refrain from
insularity, eschew jargon, and avoid assumptions of knowledge or
beliefs not shared by those outside the circle—admittedly, easier said
than done. Most importantly, in thinking about their own work,
whether academic or on the bench, theorists and judges could try to be
more aware of when that work raises questions about the empirical
world or rests on assumptions about the empirical world that are

8. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008).
9. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT (2008); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA,
BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING (2008).
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questionable. Identifying such questions could make it more obvious
to empiricists why they should read what theorists and judges write.
The benefits of having theorists and judges suggest topics for
empirical analysis would not end there. Many empiricists would likely
find studying the suggested topics intellectually rewarding. Their work
would, in turn, be read by more judges and theorists. The result, we
suspect, would be a virtuous circle, with ever-increasing engagement
among the different groups.
III. THE NEXT STAGE
Our workshop experiences and impressions from reading tell us
that suggesting questions for empirical analysis does not come easily to
judges and theorists, perhaps because of reticence, skepticism, or
certain habits of thinking. And empiricists are not especially inclined
to listen to either theorists or research subjects about what they should
be studying and how. That said, despite some apparent distrust or
misunderstanding at the initial stages, there was ultimately a high level
of intellectual engagement at the workshop. Whatever the causes for
the initial difficulties in getting the conversations going, we hope
theorists and judges will push to play a larger role in setting the
empirical research agenda, whether through calls for action or, if they
wish to be more directly involved, through active collaboration with
empirical researchers.
We end with four sets of more specific suggestions (or pleas) to
different combinations of key players. The first, to academics—both
theoretical and empirical—is to consider spreading their attention
more evenly across a broad range of courts and judicial behaviors. The
law touches people’s lives far more often and directly through state
trial courts than through federal appellate courts. And then there are
the local courts tackling small claims, traffic violations, and family
matters; the administrative law tribunals; the international law courts;
and similar court systems. All of these settings potentially provide rich
sources of insight into the workings of legal institutions. Some of these
settings have been examined by researchers, but these examinations
are relatively rare and are frequently ignored in mainstream
discussions of judges and courts.
As important as decisions on the merits of cases are, it is just as
important for us to understand how judges gather information,
evaluate evidence, interpret precedents, rule on motions, choose
language for their opinions, and so on. Further, whether in the criminal
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or civil justice systems, most parties’ experience of the courts is not the
traditional trial or a series of opinions culminating in the Supreme
Court of the jurisdiction. Rather, it is a settlement system, through plea
bargain or negotiation. But these truths, although reflected in many
individual studies, are not well reflected in the literature as a whole,
especially in political science and legal theory. Of course, we are not
advocating that scholars stop paying attention to the U.S. Supreme
Court and federal appellate decisions. Those who wish to reach judges
and produce research with wider application to the world outside of
academia, however, might achieve more success by focusing more on
the issues of most concern to the typical judge and the typical litigant
on a typical day.
The second suggestion, to empiricists alone, is to consider
embracing greater methodological flexibility. Both theorists and judges
at our workshop seemed impatient with what they viewed as empirical
researchers’ insistence on quantification, usually in the context of
large-sample studies. Their criticism is overstated, given the large
number of empirical researchers who employ qualitative techniques.
Nevertheless, it has some validity both for the literature as a whole and
for the emerging branch of that literature in legal journals. By no
means do we think it would be appropriate for empiricists to weaken
their standards in a way that would allow conclusions to be drawn from
data that do not adequately support them. But, as long as they
explicitly recognize limitations in their data, it seems to us that it may
be worthwhile to sacrifice some reliability10 and precision if it allows
them to get at things that really matter.
Our third plea is to theorists and judges. They were no more shy
about expressing criticisms of empirical work at our workshop than
they have been in print. But their criticisms are seldom as constructive
as they might be. It is of some help to an empirical researcher to hear
why a particular method of measuring a key concept is flawed; it is far
better to receive suggestions for improving the method. Is there any
10. To illustrate, Professors Gulati and Klein have collaborated on research employing types
of citation counts to measure aspects of judicial reputation and performance. E.g., Stephen J.
Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and Information Forcing: Ranking State
High Courts and Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313 (2009); David E. Klein & Darby Morrisroe, Prestige
and Influence on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998). Because the
computation of these measures does not require independent judgment, they are highly reliable.
On the other hand, although we believe that the measures are also valid, we readily concede that
they only partially capture the phenomena of interest and could usefully be supplemented by
measures that approach the phenomena from other angles, even if dependent on greater coder
judgment and so more susceptible to reliability problems.
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way of assessing the concept, even if imperfect, that would yield useful
information? If not, is there a similar concept that could be empirically
observed, allowing at least some light to be shed on the question? The
key here, we think, is patience—for theorists and judges to recognize
that a methodological difficulty is not necessarily an impossibility and,
instead of dismissing the problem, to contribute their insights in an
attempt to solve it.
Finally, a request of judges. One of the most important things they
could do to promote empirical scholarship that is significant and that
matters to them is to actively embrace the spirit of scholarly inquiry.
No one much enjoys being the focus of critical scrutiny, especially when
being evaluated by measures that seem crude. (Consider how
academics regard student evaluations of their teaching or their dean’s
annual determination of whether they have “contributed” or not). But
to the extent judges can overcome discomfort or resentment, cooperate
with researchers’ efforts to study them, and suggest ways for
researchers to improve their studies, they can significantly contribute
to the research enterprise. And there is no reason why judges should
only be subjects of research. They can also engage in research
informally or formally, whether keeping their eyes open for how things
are done in other courts and comparing those methods with their own,
engaging in experimentation to test the effectiveness of different
practices or institutions, or even conducting full-scale studies and
publishing the results. We recognize that in the current political
environment there are groups and persons who seek to damage the
judiciary in general and individual judges in particular. From our point
of view, this is lamentable. But these malevolent forces and special
interests will gather and publicize their own flawed data and empirical
studies. We ask the judges to consider that more and better empirical
study of judging and judicial institutions has the potential to lead to a
stronger judiciary and to better judging. It is also an antidote to slanted
and partisan attacks disguised as objective studies.
At the end of the day, we realize we are asking for a lot and that
others might not be as optimistic regarding the value of collaboration
among judges, theorists, and empiricists. What we saw at the workshop
itself was a great deal of openness and willingness to engage. Given
what we saw, we are certainly willing to do whatever we can to keep
the conversations going.

